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1 Introduction
The distinction between risk and uncertainty has become increasingly important since
(Knight, 1921) discussed it as we have imperfect knowledge of future events in our ever-
changing world. Informally, risk can be measured by probabilities. In contrast, uncertainty
refers to something where we cannot even gather the information required to figure out
probabilities. However, in practice there is no difference between risk and uncertainty in
empirical analysis on the economy and financial markets. Both are measured by historical
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standard deviation of the variable of interest (Hull, 2010; Arratia, 2014). This paper proposes
an alternative to disentangle these seemingly indistinguishable concepts applying ideas
from game theory and computer science.
The study of web applications is a field where uncertainty becomes unavoidable. The
angel-daemon framework (Gabarro et al., 2014) provides a way to obtain numerical esti-
mates of uncertainty in the execution of a Web service. Reality often evolves in between
optimism and pessimism. To model this situation, the framework considers two agents : the
angel (a), dealing with the optimistic side; and the daemon (d), dealing with the pessimistic
side. These agents act strategically in an associated angel-daemon game. Here, we present an
angel-daemon (a/d) framework to model uncertainty in short-term macroeconomic models.
In the a/d approach the actions undertaken by a and d usually go into different directions
and can affect the result of underlying systems in unexpected ways. In some cases, a or d
may be identified with policy makers or institutions. In other cases, they may describe a situ-
ation created by many interacting agents. To test the applicability of the a/d framework, we
start with linear approximation of extensively studied models. In particular, we develop a/d
analysis of the InvestmentSavings-LiquidityMoney (IS-LM) introduced by (Hicks, 1937,
1980-1981) and the InvestmentSavings-MonetaryPolicy (IS-MP) developped by (Romer,
2000).
In order to make this paper self contained for the wide audience, we describe the
two basic Macroeconomic models considered in this paper. The InvestmentSavings-
LiquidityMoney model (IS-LM) (Hicks, 1937) provides a way to express, in equilibrium,
the national income and the interest rate as a a function of several exogenous components.
Despite its simplicity, this model continues making useful predictions (Krugman, 2011).
The IS line Y = C(Y − T ) + I(r) +G represents a continuum of equilibria in the goods
market. On it, Y is the national income, r is the interest rate. The remaining components
are the sum of the annual rates of spending by: the consumers (as a function of the dis-
posable income) C(Y − T ); the investors (as a function of the interest rate) I(r) and the
governmentG. The LM lineM/P = L(r, Y ) is interpreted as continuum of equilibrium in
the money market. The money supply is M/P , where M is the money and P is the price
level. The liquidity preference L(r, Y ) is a function of the national income and the interest
rate. An equilibrium point (Y, r) is a solution of the system of equations. These equilibria
correspond to the points where both markets are at mutual equilibrium.
In the thirties, the world was in transition from the gold standard and the monetary
policy of the central banks changed to deal with inflation. The Central Bank creates new
money by lending to banks for very short periods (Piketty, 2014). The primary objective of
the European Central Bank is to maintain price stability. The European Central Bank aims at
maintaining inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over the medium term (ECB, 2015). The
InvestementSaving-MonetaryPolicy model (IS-MP) (Romer, 2000) considers this reality.
We start with the dynamic aggregate demand/aggregate supply model, (Mankiw, 2013).
The supply for goods and services is given by Yt = Y t − α(rt − ρ) + t. In this equation,
the total output for goods and services is Yt and the economy’s natural output is Y t. The
parameter α > 0 measures the sensitivity of the demand in front of the real interest rate
rt and ρ is the natural rate of interest. The parameter t represents the random demand
shock. The real interest rate rt is given by a simplified version of Fisher’s equation with
no expectations: rt = it − pit where it is the nominal interest rate and pit is the inflation
rate. The inflation pit at period t is described by a version of the Phillips curve as a function
of the past inflation pit−1 and with no expectations: pit = pit−1 + φ(Yt − Y t) + vt. The
parameter φ > 0 measures the responsiveness of the inflation to output fluctuations and
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Variables V
Taxes 0 < T
Exogenous government spending 0 < G
Money Supply 0 < M
Price index 0 < P
Parameters P
Autonomous consumption 0 < a
Marginal propensity to consume 0 < b < 1
Exogenous investment 0 < c
Interest sensitivity 0 < d
Income sensitivity for real money 0 < e
Interest sensitivity for real money 0 < f
Figure 1 The exogenous components in the linear approximation to the IS-LM model.
vt is the random supply shock. The monetary policy is based on Taylor’s Rule (Taylor,
1993). The nominal interest rate it is given by it = pit + ρ+ θpi(pit − pi∗t ) + θY (Yt − Y t).
In this equation, pi∗t is the central bank’s target inflation rate and θpi > 0, θY > 0 measure
responsiveness. We avoid temporal dependencies and we consider a version of the IS-MP
model assuming that past inflation coincides with the Central Bank target inflation. As
before an equilibrium point (Y, pi) is a solution of the system of equations.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the linear approximations and
exogenous components. In Section 3, we provide a model for perturbations of the exogenous
components, the so called perturbation strength model. Section 4 introduces uncertainty
profiles and the associated a/d games tailored to the linear IS-LM and IS-MP models and
analyses the Nash equilibria of some cases. Section 5 studies the IS-LM model when we are
uncertain of the fiscal policy and Section 6 studies the IS-MP model when we are uncertain
of the external shocks. Finally, in Section 7, we raise some remarks and future research.
2 Linear Approximations and Exogenous Components
We useM to denote a linear approximation of a model,M ∈ {IS-LM, IS-MP}. For a model
M, PM denotes the set of exogenous parameters, VM denotes the the set of exogenous
variables and EM = PM ∪ VM is the set of exogenous components. We use set notation
like b ∈ PM or T ∈ VM. When M is clear from the context we use E , P and V . Let us start
with the linear approximation of the IS-LM model (Baldani et al., 2007).
Definition 1: The IS-LM model is described by the following equations: C(Y − T ) =
a+ b(Y − T ), I(r) = c− d r,L(r, Y ) = eY − f r. The set exogenous components is E =
V ∪ P with V = {a, b, c, d, e, f} and P = {T,G,M,P} (see Figure 1).
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Let us express the endogenous variables {Y, r} in equilibrium as a function of E . The
equilibrium condition Y = Y (r) (IS line) gives the equation Y = a+ b(Y − T ) + c−
d r +G. The condition r = r(Y ) (MP line) gives M/P = eY − f r. Thus, we get
Y =
1
(1− b) (a+ c+G− b T − d r) and r =
1
f
(e Y − M
P
).
With matrices:(
1− b d
P e − P f
)(
Y
r
)
=
(
a+ c+G− b T
M
)
.
Solving the system, we get (Y, r).(
Y
r
)
=
1
(1− b)f + d e
(
f d/P
e − (1− b)/P
)(
a+ c+G− b T
M
)
.
and defining g = (1− b)f + d e we get:
Y =
f
g
(a+ c+G− bT ) + d
g
M
P
and r =
e
g
(a+ c+G− bT )− (1− b)
g
M
P
.
As (Y, r) depends on E , when needed we write (Y (E), r(E)).
Example 2.1: Consider the following E:
a b c d e f T G M P
200 3/4 200 25 1 100 100 100 1000 2
The linear system is Y = 1700− 100r, r = Y/100− 5, solving Y = 1100, r = 6. 2
We present now the linear approximation to the IS-MP model from (Mankiw, 2013).
Yt = Y t − αˆ(pit − pi∗t ) + βˆt where αˆ =
αθpi
1 + αθY
and βˆ =
1
1 + αθY
pit = pit−1 + φ(Yt − Y t) + vt.
We consider a simplified linear approximation in which we avoid dependences of inflation
on their lagged values. We consider only the case where the past inflation coincides with
the Central Bank target inflation, i.e. pit−1 = pi∗t . Furthermore, assuming that period t is
known, we drop the sub-index.
Definition 2: The IS-MP model is described by the equations: Y = Y − αˆ(pi − pi∗) + βˆ
and pi = pi∗ + φ(Y − Y ) + v. The set of exogenous components E = V ∪ P is given by
V = {pi∗, Y , , v} and P = {α, ρ, φ, θpi, θY } (see Figure 2).
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Variables V
Central bank’s target inflation pi∗
Natural level of output Y
Shock to Y 
Shock to pi v
Parameters P
Y sensitivity to r 0 < α
Natural interest rate 0 < ρ
pi sensitivity to Y in Philips line 0 < φ
i sensitivity to inflation in MP 0 < θpi
i sensitivity to Y in MP 0 < θY
Figure 2 The exogenous components in the linear approximation to the IS-MP model.
Solving the system, Y = Y + γˆ− δˆv and pi = pi∗ + ρˆ+ µˆv where
γˆ =
βˆ
1 + αˆφ
=
1
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
and δˆ =
αˆ
1 + αˆφ
=
αθpi
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
ρˆ =
φβˆ
1 + αˆφ
=
φ
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
and µˆ =
1
1 + αˆφ
=
1 + αθY
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
.
In matrix form:(
Y
pi
)
=
(
γˆ − δˆ
ρˆ µˆ
)(

v
)
+
(
Y
pi∗
)
(
Y
pi
)
=
1
1 + α(θY + φθpi)
(
1 −αθpi
φ 1 + αθY
)(

v
)
+
(
Y
pi∗
)
.
The equilibrium point (Y, pi) is a function of E , when needed we write (Y (E), pi(E)).
Example 2.2: Consider the following E for the IS-MP model:
α ρ φ θpi θY pi
∗ Y  v
1 2 1/4 1/2 1/2 2 100 1 1/2
We can compute directly(
Y
pi
)
=
1
13
(
8 −4
2 12
)(
1
1/2
)
+
(
100
2
)
=
1
13
(
1306
34
)
Therefore Y = 1306/13 and pi = 34/13. 2
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3 Perturbation Strength Model
We start with a description of the perceived potential perturbations in the model.
Definition 3: Let M be a macroeconomic model and let E be the set of its exogenous
components. A perturbation strength model for E is a set of S of pairs of real numbers,
i.e., S = {(δa(e), δd(e)) | e ∈ E} describing the potential changes that can be applied to
the valuations of the exogenous components by a and d.
Observe that perturbations are real numbers, so they can be either positive or negative.
Example 3.1: A perturbation strength model S for the IS-LM model E given in Example
2.1 is:
agent a b c, d, e, f T G M P
a 0 +1/20 0 0 +50 0 0
d 0 0 0 +50 −25 0 +1
The angel a has the ability to act upon the parameters {b,G}, then δa(b) = 1/20, δa(G) =
50 an For any e ∈ E \ {b,G}, a, δa(e) = 0. The daemon d has the ability to act upon
some of the parameters in {P, T,G}, then δd(P ) = 1, δd(T ) = 50, δd(G) = −25 and for
e ∈ E \ {P, T,G}, δd(e) = 0. 2
Example 3.2: In this example a and d can perturb the predetermined variables V in the
IS-MP model given in Example 2.2. One perturbation strength model S is
agent α, ρ, φ, θpi , θY pi∗ Y  v
a 0 0 +25 +2 0
d 0 +3 0 0 +2
InS , a can potentially act over Y and . That is δa(Y ) = 25 and δa() = 2 but, for any other
e ∈ {α, ρ, φ, θpi, θY , pi∗, v}, δa(e) = 0. d can potentially act over pi∗ and v with δd(pi∗) = 3
and δd(v) = 2, all other δd(e) = 0. 2
For a set s ⊆ E , #s denotes the number of components in s.
Definition 4: Consider a model M having exogenous components E under a perturbation
strength model S . Given a joint action (a, d) with a, d ⊆ E . The valuation under strength
E ′ of E given S and (a, d) is noted strengthS(E)[a, d] and it is defined as follows. For any
e ∈ E , strengthS(e)[a, d] = e+ δS(e)[a, d] where
δS(e)[a, d] =

0 e /∈ a ∪ d
δa(e) e ∈ a \ d
δd(e) e ∈ d \ a
δa(e) + δd(e) e ∈ a ∩ d
finally, strengthS(E)[a, d] = {strengthS(e)[a, d] | e ∈ E}.
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Let us move to the computation of the equilibrium point in the valuation obtained
after a joint action (a, d) of the two agents. We denote the equilibrium point as
(Y (strengthS(E)[a, d]), r(strengthS(E)[a, d]). When S is clear from the context we note
strengthS(E)[a, d] as E(a, d) and the equilibrium point as (Y (a, d), r(a, d)). The following
result points out some basic properties (proof straightforward).
Lemma 1: Let M be a model having exogenous components E under a perturbation
strength model S and consider a joint action (a, d). Then strengthS(e)[a, d] = e if and
only if either e /∈ a ∪ d or δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. The whole system remains unperturbed, i.e.
strengthS(E)[a, d] = E when S = {(0, 0) | e ∈ E} or (a, d) = (∅, ∅).
Following, we provide an application of the Definition 4 to the IS-LM model.
Example 3.3: We continue with Examples 2.1 and 3.1 under the joint action (a, d) =
({b}, {P,G}). After the joint action we get a new valuation, letting E ′ = E({b}, {P,G})
and e′ = strength(e)[{b}, {P,G}]. We have E ′ = strengthS(E)[{b}, {P,G}] =
{a′, b′, c′, d′, e′, f ′, T ′, G′,M ′, P ′}. The values of E ′ are given in the following table.
agent choice a b c d e f T G M P
200 3/4 200 25 1 100 100 100 1000 2
a a = {b} +1/20
d d = {P,G} −25 +1
a′ b′ c′ d′ e′ f ′ T ′ G′ M ′ P ′
200 4/5 200 25 1 100 100 75 1000 3
The equilibrium point corresponding to E({b}, {P,G}) is Y ({b}, {P,G}) = 28700/27 ≈
1062.96, r({b}, {P,G}) = 197/27 ≈ 7.29. 2
WhenM is perturbed from valuation E into E ′ by joint action (a, d), we would like to isolate
the effects of the the perturbation by expressing the equilibrium point (Y (a, d), r(a, d))
with respect to the non-perturbed equilibrium point (Y, r). The proofs of the following
lemmas are straightforward.
Lemma 2: Consider a perturbation strength model S for the IS-LM model such that, for
e ∈ {b, d, e, f, P}, we have δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. Let (a, d) be a joint action and define
δS(a, c,G, T )[a, d] = δS(a)[a, d] + δS(c)[a, d] + δS(G)[a, d]− b δS(T )[a, d].
Then, it holds(
Y (a, d)
r(a, d)
)
=
(
Y
r
)
+
1
g
(
f d/P
e − (1− b)/P
)(
δS(a, c,G, T )[a, d]
δS(M)[a, d]
)
We are also interested in valuations E in relation to fiscal policies.
Lemma 3: Consider a perturbation strength model S where {G,T} are the unique com-
ponents that can be perturbed. For a joint action (a, d), we have(
Y (a, d)
r(a, d)
)
=
(
Y
r
)
+
1
g
δS(G,T )[a, d]
(
f
e
)
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where δS(G,T )[a, d] = δS(G)[a, d]− bδS(T )[a, d].
Our next result provides the equilibrium point in the IS-MP model when the exogenous
parameters cannot be perturbed.
Lemma 4: Consider a perturbation strength model S for the IS-MP model such that, for
e ∈ P , δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. For any joint action (a, d) it holds that(
Y (a, d)
pi(a, d)
)
=
(
Y
pi
)
+
(
γˆ − δˆ
ρˆ µˆ
)(
δS()[a, d]
δS(v)[a, d]
)
+
(
δS(Y )[a, d]
δS(pi∗)[a, d]
)
.
In Section 6 we will consider the case where only the income Y and the inflation pi become
uncertain. For such a case we have the following expression for equilibrium point.
Lemma 5: Consider a perturbation strength model S for the IS-MP model such that, for
e ∈ E \ {Y , pi∗}, we have δa(e) = δd(e) = 0. For any joint action (a, d), it holdsY (a, d) =
Y + δS(Y )[a, d] and pi(a, d) = pi + δS(pi∗)[a, d].
We illustrate the computation of the equilibrium point in a perturbed scenario.
Example 3.4: Let us continue with the Example 3.2 in the IS-MP model. Consider the joint
action (a, d) = ({}, {pi∗, v}). Writing the new values as e′ = strength(e)[({}, {pi∗, v}].
As usual E ′ = E({}, {pi∗, v}) = {α′, ρ′, φ′, θ′pi, θ′Y , pi∗′, Y
′
, ′, v′}. A sketch of the com-
putation of the perturbed valuation is given in the following table.
agent choice α ρ φ θpi θY pi∗ Y  v
1 2 1/4 1/2 1/2 2 100 1 1/2
a a = {} +2
d d = {pi∗, v} +3 +2
α′ ρ′ φ′ θ′pi θ′Y pi
∗′ Y ′ ′ v′
1 2 1/4 1/2 1/2 5 100 3 5/2
As  ∈ a \ d, according to the Definition 4 we have
′ = strength()[({}, {pi∗, v}] = + δS [{}, {pi∗, v}] = + δa() = 3.
As pi ∈ d \ a, pi∗′ = pi + δd(pi∗) = 5. Similarly v′ = v + δd(v) = 5/2. All other values
remain unchanged. In order to obtain (Y ′, pi∗′) = (Y (a, d), pi(a, d)), by using Lemma 4,
we have(
Y ′
pi′
)
=
1
13
(
1306
34
)
+
1
13
(
8 − 4
2 12
)(
δa()
δd(v)
)
+
(
0
δa(pi
∗)
)
=
1
13
(
1314
101
)
.
2
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4 Uncertainty Profiles and a/d games
In this section, we present the model and tools to analyse a situation under a given pertur-
bation strength model. Uncertainty profiles Gabarro et al. (2014) are based in three compo-
nents. The first one identifies the set of exogenous components that might be perturbed. The
second states the limits in the number of components that can suffer perturbation. The third
component quantifies (as function of the exogenous components) the benefits for the agents.
In such a setting, we are uncertain about the specific subset that will suffer the perturbation.
Definition 5: Given M, E and a perturbation strength S, a uncertainty profile is a tuple
U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 where A,D ⊆ E . The spread of the perturbation ba and
bd, verify ba ≤ #A and bd ≤ #D. The exerted perturbation follows from joint actions
(a, d) verifying a ⊆ A, d ⊆ D with #a = ba and #d = bd. The effects of a joint action are
measured by the utility functions ua and ud. Given a joint action (a, d), ua(a, d) measures
a’s gain while ud(a, d) measures d’s gain.
The situation described by an uncertainty profileU is analysed by means of an associated
strategic a/d game. In such a game a and d decide their actions strategically. For basics on
game theory we refer the reader to (Osborne, 2004; Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994)).
Definition 6: Given M, E , S and U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉, the associated angel-
daemon strategic game (the a/d game) is defined as Γ(U) = 〈{a, d}, Aa, Ad, ua, ud〉. Game
Γ(U) has two players {a, d}. The player’s actions areAa = {a ⊆ A | #a = ba} andAd =
{d ⊆ D | #d = bd}. Their utilities are ua and ud.
Notice that, in an a/d game the set of strategy profiles is Aa ×Ad. Thus strategy
profiles are permissible joint actions. Recall that, a pure Nash equilibrium is a strategy
profile such that neither a nor d can improve the situation by himself (Osborne, 2004).
Formally, a strategy profile (a, d) is a pure Nash equilibrium if and only if ua(a, d) ≥
ua(a
′, d), for all a′ ∈ Aa, and ud(a, d) ≥ ud(a, d′), for all d′ ∈ Ad. We note by PNE(Γ)
the set of pure Nash equilibria of Γ. When Γ is clear from the context we just write PNE.
Given d ∈ Ad the best response of a to d’s choice d is the set of strategies giving to a
the maximum utility, i.e., Ba(d) = {a | ua(a, d) ≥ ua(a′, d) for all a′ ∈ Aa}. Similarly,
Bd(a) = {d | ud(a, d) ≥ ud(a, d′) for all d′ ∈ Ad}. It is well known that (a, d) ∈ PNE
if and only if a ∈ Ba(d) and b ∈ Bd(a). Formally, PNE = {(a, d) | a ∈ Ba(d) and b ∈
Bd(a)}. The following lemmas are straightforward. Next lemma considers two extreme
cases where neither a nor d have freedom to make choices.
Lemma 6: Let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 be an uncertainty profile for M. When
ba = #A and bd = #D, the only PNE of Γ(U) is (A,D). When ba = 0 and bd = 0, the
only PNE of Γ(U) is is (∅, ∅).
Our next result shows that in an equilibrium, when one of the two agents cannot act, the
other agent maximizes his utility.
Lemma 7: Let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉 be an uncertainty profile for M. When
bd = 0 it holds PNE(Γ(U)) = {(a, ∅) | ua(a, ∅) = maxa′∈Aa ua(a′, ∅)}. When ba = 0 it
holds PNE(Γ(U)) = {(∅, d) | ud(∅, d) = maxd′∈Ad ud(∅, d′)}.
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We present examples of a/d games arising in the analysis of uncertainty profiles for the
IS-LM and the IS-MP models. We have selected them to illustrate some aspects of the PNE
in the a/d games.
Example 4.1: Take M = IS-LM with E from Example 2.1 and S from Example 3.1. We
will define A and D depending on the uncertain scenario we are interested to describe.
Consider a situation in which we are interested to know how perturbations affects Y and r
when the marginal propensity to consume might be perturbed in an angelic way while the
price of goods and taxes might be perturbed in a daemonic way. However, the exogenous
government spending might be perturbed in both directions. In consequence we set A =
{b,G} and D = {P,G, T}. Assume that we do not expect perturbations to be exerted at
the same time on more than one component. So, we set ba = bd = 1. We are interested to
know how perturbations affects Y and r. So, we take ua = Y and we need to precise the
interests of d with respect to r.
First, we want to catch a “worst-case” situation where the perturbation increases
the interest rate. The dictum, “having hight interest rate is bad" is captured by setting
ud = r. In this case, d tries to maximize r. The so obtained uncertainty profile U1 =
〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y, r〉 mimics an uncertain situation asking at the same time
for a hight income and a high interest rate. Second, we consider a “best-case” situation. As
raising interest rate r has negative effects, we are interested to know what happens when this
is not the case. So, r is considered a dis-utility. Raising r is seen as a negative fact. Thus we
define ud = −r (note that maximizing −r is the same as minimizing r). These considera-
tions lead to the uncertainty profile U2 = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y,−r〉. First, let us
consider U1 and analyse Γ(U1). We haveAa = {a ⊆ {b,G} | #a = 1} = {{b}, {G}} and
Ad = {d ⊆ {P,G, T} | #d = 2} = {{P,G}, {P, T}, {T,G}}. The utilities are ua = Y
and ud = r which can be tabulated in the usual bi-matrix form. Computing the utilities of
a and d (according to Example 3.3), after applying the perturbation to the selected com-
ponents, we get, for example Y ({b}, {P,G}) ≈ 1062.96 and r({b}, {P,G}) ≈ 7.29. The
remaining results are summarized in the following bi-matrix representation of Γ(U1).
d
{P,G} {P, T} {T,G}
a
{b} 1062.96, 7.29 1029.62, 6.962 1233.33, 22/3 ≈ 7.33
{G} 1066.66, 22/3 ≈ 7.33 1041.66, 7.08 1075, 5.75
and Ba({P,G}) = {{G}}, Ba({P, T}) = {{G}}, Ba({T,G}) = {{b}} and, in the case
of d, best responses areBd({b}) = {{T,G}},Bd({G}) = {{P,G}}. Thus PNE(Γ(U1)) =
{({G}, {P,G}), ({b}, {T,G})}. Observe that a and d get different rewards in the different
PNE. In the case of U2 we find PNE(Γ(U2)) = ∅. Many other cases might be of interest. In
any case, the analyser should transform a perception into an uncertainty profiles. 2
Example 4.2: Let us continue with the Examples 3.2 and 3.4 of the IS-MP model. We
consider the uncertainty profiles where ua = Y and analyse the situations in which d has
opposite interests in the inflation pi, therefore we consider:
U1 = 〈E ,S, {, Y }, {v, pi∗}, 1, 1, Y, pi〉, U2 = 〈E ,S, {, Y }, {v, pi∗}, 1, 1, Y,−pi〉
and PNE(Γ(U1)) = {({Y }, {pi∗})}, PNE(Γ(U2)) = {({Y }, {v})}. 2
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It is well know that although a strategic game might not have a PNE, it always
has a Nash equilibrium on mixed strategies (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). A mixed
strategies for a player is a probability distribution on its set of actions. Thus in an a/d
game, a mixed strategy profile is a tuple (α, β) where α : Aa → [0, 1] and β : Ad → [0, 1]
are probability distributions. The utility for player p ∈ {a, d} is defined as up(α, β) =∑
(a,d)∈Aa×Ad α(a)β(d)up(a, d).
Example 4.3: Consider Γ(U1) defined in Example 4.1. Taking 0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1 and y +
z ≤ 1, let (α, β) a mixed strategy for Γ(U1) such that α =
(
α({b}), α({G})) = (x, 1− x)
and β =
(
β({P,G}), β({P, T}), β({T,G})) = (y, z, 1− y − z). Setting x = 1/3, y =
1/4 and z = 1/2 we get (α, β) =
(
(1/3, 2/3), (1/4, 1/2, 1/4)
)
. Utilities are ua(α, β) =
1067.124 and ud(α, β) = 6.9195. 2
The definition of Nash equilibrium extends to mixed strategies. Following, we adapt to a/d
games the characterization given in (Osborne, 2004).
Property 8: A mixed strategy profile (α, β) is a mixed Nash equilibrium in Γ(U) if
the following two symmetric conditions hold. For all a ∈ Aa, when α(a) > 0 we have
ua(α, β) = ua(a, β), otherwise ua(α, β) ≥ ua(a, β). For all d ∈ Ad, when β(d) > 0 we
have ud(α, β) = ud(α, d), otherwise ud(α, β) ≥ ud(α, d).
Example 4.4: Let us continue with the Example 4.1. The a/d game corresponding to
U2 = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, Y,−r〉 has no PNE. Based on property 8 we find that
(α, β) = ((0.78174, 0.21826), (0, 0.9293303, 0.07066972) is a mixed Nash equilibrium.
Utilities are ua(α, β) = 1044.016 and ud(α, β) = −6.98775. 2
Games can have more than one Nash equilibrium and get different utilities in those situations.
This property does not happen in the case of two players zero-sum games (von Neumann
& Morgenstern, 1944). All the Nash equilibria have the same utility for the first player, this
utility is called the value of the game. In a zero-sum a/d game, ud + ua = 0. We model
this situation by considering a unique objective function u so that ua = u and ud = −u,
we write U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, u〉. The value of Γ(U) is denoted by ν(U) is expressed as
ν(U) = minα∈∆a maxβ∈∆d u(α, β) = maxβ∈∆d minα∈∆a u(α, β). A way to get a zero-
sum is to consider (a, d) as a perturbation of(∅, ∅), then U ′ = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, u〉 where
u(a, d) = ua(a, d)−
(
ua(∅, ∅)/ud(∅, ∅)
)
ud(a, d).
Example 4.5: Given U1 in Example 4.1, consider U = 〈E ,S, {b,G}, {P,G, T}, 1, 2, u〉
with u(a, d) = Y (a, d)− (Y (∅, ∅/r(∅, ∅))r(a, d). From lemma 1, (Y (∅, ∅), r(∅, ∅)) =
(Y, r) = (1100, 6). As 1100/6 = 550/3 we get u(a, d) = Y (a, d)− (550/3)r(a, d). The
corresponding zero-sum a/d game Γ(U) is described by the table of u:
d
{P,G} {P, T} {T,G}
a
{b} −22250/81 ≈ −274.69 −20000/81 ≈ −246.91 −1000/9 ≈ −111.11
{G} −2500/9 ≈ −277.77 −4625/18 ≈ −256.94 125/6 ≈ 20.83
In this case, there is one PNE at ({b}, {P,G}), therefore we know that all NE will
provide the same utility and that ν(U) = −22250/81. 2
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Example 4.6: Let us reconsider the Example 4.2. This leads to the uncertainty profileU =
〈E ,S, {, Y },D = {v, pi∗}, 1, 1, u〉 where u(a, d) = Y (a, d)− (Y (∅, ∅)/pi(∅, ∅))pi(a, d).
According to Example 2.2, Y (∅, ∅) = 1306/13 and pi(∅, ∅) = 34/13. In this case Γ(U) has
a PNE ({Y }, {pi∗}) and ν(U) = −1534/17 ≈ −90.23. 2
5 Uncertainty in the IS-LM Model
We consider the case in which a perturbation is exerted only on the fiscal policy, i.e.,
A = D = {G,T}. Furthermore, we assume also that a and d can control just one of the
components. We analyse two situations with respect to the utilities. In the first case a’s
objective is to increase the income as much as possible while d tries to increase the interest
rate. In the second case we considerer a zero-sum approach taking u = Y − k r.
5.1 A Case of Fiscal Policy under Uncertainty in the IS-LM Model
Consider the case where a and d have the capability to act over T and G, that is Aa =
Ad = {{T}, {G}} and ua = Y and ud = r (as it was the case in Example 4.1). We ask if
the addition of uncertainty can generate a situation in which no PNE exists. We provide
a negative answer. Before stating the result. Let us remind, the definition of dominant
strategy equilibrium (DSE) taken from (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). A DSE is a joint
action (a, d) such that, for any other joint action (a′, d′) ∈ Aa ×Ad, ua(a, d′) ≥ ua(a′, d′)
and ud(a′, d) ≥ ud(a′, d′). As pointed out in (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994), in a DSE, the
action of every player is a best response independently on which are the actions taken by
the other players. Our next result proves the existence of DSE when the perturbation has to
be exerted only in one component
Theorem 9: Let S be a perturbation strength model, for the IS-LM model, such that
δp(e) = 0 for e ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, f,M, P} and p ∈ {a, d}. For the uncertainty profile U =
〈E ,S, {G,T}, {G,T}, 1, 1, Y, r〉, the following Γ(U) has always a DSE:
d
{T} {G}
a
{T} ua = Y −
f
g b(δa(T ) + δd(T )) ua = Y +
f
g (δd(G)− bδa(T ))
ud = r − eg b(δa(T ) + δd(T )) ud = r + eg (δd(G)− bδa(T ))
{G} ua = Y +
f
g (δa(G)− bδd(T )) ua = Y + fg (δa(G) + δd(G))
ud = r +
e
g (δa(G)− bδd(T )) ud = r + eg (δa(G) + δd(G))
Proof: Defining µp,T→G = bδp(T ) + δp(G) it holds that
Bp({T}) = Bp({G}) =

{G} if µp,T→G > 0
{T,G} if µp,T→G = 0
{T} if µp,T→G < 0
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According to the best responses, by case analysis, we find the following PNE structure:
µa,T→G > 0 µa,T→G = 0 µa,T→G < 0
µd,T→G > 0 {G,G} {G,T},{G,G} {G,T}
µd,T→G = 0 {T,G} {G,G} {G,G}{G,T}{T,G}{T, T} {T, T}{G,T}
µd,T→G < 0 {T,G} {T, T}{T,G} {T, T}
To prove the existence of a DSE we consider first the case µp,T→G > 0, for p ∈ {a, d}. In
such a case, ({G}, {G}) is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Other cases are similar. 
Consider balanced budgets where the government spends the amount δ collected by
taxation. The strength model Sbalanced verifies δp(e) = 0 for e ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, f,M, P}for
p ∈ {a, d}, as in Theorem 9, moreover and δa(T ) = δd(G) = 0 and δa(G) = δd(T ) = δ.
The only PNE of Γ(〈E ,Sbalanced , {G,T}, {G,T}, 1, 1, Y,−r〉) is ({G}, {T}). This Nash
equilibrium corresponds precisely to the case where Government spends the amount δ
collected by taxes and this corresponds to a balanced budget.
5.2 Direct Control over Income and Interest Rate from a and d
We consider now the case where a is interested in controlling both, Y and r, directly.
Theorem 10: Let S be a perturbation strength model for the IS-LM model such that
δp(e) = 0 for e ∈ {a, b, c, d, e, f,M, P} and p ∈ {a, d} moreover δa(G) = −δd(G) =
δG ≥ 0 and δd(T ) = −δa(T ) = δT > 0. Take U = 〈E ,S, {T,G}, {T,G}, 1, 1, u〉 where
u(a, d) = Y (a, d)− k r(a, d). Letting δ = bδT − δG, the Γ(U) game is given by
d
{T} {G}
a
{T} Y − k r (Y − k r) + (1/g)(f − k e)δ
{G} (Y − k r)− (1/g)(f − k e)δ Y − k r
When (f − k e)δ = 0, the four strategy profiles of Γ(U) are PNE, otherwise either
({T}, {T}) or ({G}, {G}) is the unique PNE of Γ(U) .
Proof: When (f − k e)δ = 0 all the pure strategies have the same utility Y − k r and
therefore all of them are PNE. When Y − k r > 0 and (f − k e)δ > 0 the only PNE is
({T}, {T}). When Y − k r > 0 and (f − k e)δ < 0 the only PNE is ({G}, {G}). When
Y − k r < 0 and (f − k e)δ > 0 the only PNE is ({T}, {T}). When Y − k r < 0 and
(f − k e)δ < 0 the only PNE is ({G}, {G}). Finally, when k = Y/r, we have u(a, d) =
Y (a, d)− (Y/r)r(a, d). The a/d game has ({T}, {T}) as PNE in when u({T}, {G}) > 0.
When u({T}, {G}) < 0 the PNE is ({G}, {G}). 
6 Uncertainty in the IS-MP Model
Now we consider the case where the income Y and the inflation pi become uncertain due
to perturbations in {Y , pi∗}. We analyse the case where a benevolent a tries to keep the
income as high as possible, ua = Y . As in Example 4.2, we consider different views of d
in relation to r. To model the case where d tries to maximize the inflation, we take ud = pi.
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To model the case where pi is a dis-utility d tries to minimize pi, we take ud = −pi. The
following theorem consider both cases.The proof follows preceding techniques.
Theorem 11: Let S be a perturbation strength model for the IS-MP model with δa(e) =
δd(e) = 0, for any e ∈ E \ {Y , pi∗} and δa(Y ) > 0 and δd(pi∗) > 0. Consider and uncer-
tainty profile U = 〈E ,S, {Y , pi∗}, {Y , pi∗}, 1, 1, Y, ud〉. When ud = pi the a/d game is
d
{Y } {pi∗}
a
{Y } Y + δa(Y ) + δd(Y ), pi Y + δa(Y ), pi + δd(pi∗)
{pi∗} Y + δd(Y ), pi + δa(pi∗) Y, pi + δa(pi∗) + δd(pi∗)
{Y } is the dominant strategy for a and {pi∗} is the dominant strategy for d. The unique
PNE is ({Y }, {pi∗}) with Y ({Y }, {pi∗}) = Y + δd(Y ) and pi({Y }, {pi∗}) = pi + δa(pi∗).
When ud = −pi the game is
d
{Y } {pi∗}
a
{Y } Y + δa(Y ) + δd(Y ), −pi Y + δa(Y ), −pi + δd(pi∗)
{pi∗} Y + δd(Y ), −pi + δa(pi∗) Y, −pi + δa(pi∗) + δd(pi∗)
The dominant strategy for both a and d is {Y } and the only PNE is ({Y }, {Y }). In this
case Y ({Y }, {Y }) = Y + δa(Y ) + δd(Y ) and pi({Y }, {Y }) = pi.
We conclude our study considering a subclass of zero-sum a/d games generalizing the
conditions of the uncertainty profiles considered in Example 4.2.
Theorem 12: Let S be a perturbation strength model for the IS-MP model such that
δa(e) = δd(e) = 0, for any e ∈ P . Let U = 〈E ,S,A,D, 1, 1, u〉 where the utility is
u(a, d) = Y (a, d)− (Y ({∅}, {∅})/pi({∅}, {∅}))pi(a, d). In Γ(U), when δp(e) > 0, for p ∈
{a, d} and e ∈ {Y , pi∗}, {Y } is the dominant strategy for a and {pi∗} is the dominant
strategy for d. Furthermore, ({Y }, {pi∗}) is the unique PNE.
7 Conclusions and Further Developments
We have shown how to adapt thea/d-framework provided in (Gabarro et al., 2014) to analyse
uncertainty in the IS-LM and the IS-MP models. In both cases, we have studied different
possible cases of uncertainty through the set of Nash equilibria showing the applicability
of the framework.
Our approach can be adapted to analyse uncertainty in other financial settings. We do
that considering uncertainty in the price f of a call option over a stock S. We use the one
step binomial tree model (Hull, 1989) having the following components and values:
Stock price S = 20 Time period T = 0.25 Up jump u = 1.1
Strike price X = 21 Risk-free rate r = 0.12 Down jump d = 0.6
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Let us take E = {r, u, d} and S such that δa(r) = −0.05, δa(u) = 0.4, δa(d) = 0 and
δd(r) = 0.10, δd(u) = 0, δd(d) = 0.3. Let U = 〈E ,S, {{u}, {r}}, {{d}, {r}}, 1, 1, f〉 be
an uncertainty profile for a call option. The corresponding a/d game is:
d
{d} {r}
a
{u} 1.898985 4.321089
{r} 0.5780649 0.8499314
The only PNE is ({u}, {d}) with ν(U) = 1.898985. Therefore, in the uncertain situation
described by U perhaps the price of the call should be 1.898985 rather than 0.835465.
It is important to know the possibilities and limits of the uncertainty profiles in macroe-
conomics. As pointed in (Durlauf, 2012), a way to decide with no probabilities is to guard
against really bad cases. In such a setting regret analysis provides a way to analyse such
cases. Analysing the connection between a/d and regret analysis would be interesting. In
(Nordhaus, 2013), different scenarios are developed in order to analyse different possibilities
in relation to climate change.
It is also important to know the possibilities, limits and weaknesses of the a/d approach.
We have considered uncertainty profiles U = 〈E ,S,A,D, ba, bd, ua, ud〉where the spreads
ba, bd are fixed independently of the other parameters in U . It is interesting to consider
the case where the spreads are related to other parameters, for instance ba = b 12#Ac or
bd = b 23#Ac. Moreover, any U is a tuple having many parameters to be determined, the
danger of over parametrization exists (Hull, 2010).
Finally, in this paper we have consider only short-time models. In (Castro et al., 2015)
a time dimension of the a/d approach was integrated into the frame of stochastic automata.
Perhaps this approach, based on stochastic automata, could be adapted to deal with the
uncertainty along the time of some economic models.
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